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Abstract
This paper analyses the risk–control trade–o¤ in corporate ownership. It presents a simple
model in which large shareholders decide their share depending on their risk aversion,
risk–neutral e¤ects attached to …rm size and the e¤ectiveness of di¤erent (external and
internal) mechanisms for controlling managers’ behaviour. Two institutional settings in
which the expected bene…ts from control appear to overcome risk aspects are explored:
the USA at the turn of the 20th century and Spain in the 1990’s. The empirical evidence
seems to support the predictions of the model regardingthe relationshipbetweenownership
concentration, the characteristics of governance and the size of the …rm.
Keywords: Corporate Governance, Disciplinary Mechanisms, Large Shareholders
JEL Classi…cation: C23, D23, D81, G341 Introduction
Ownership is a central institution in trade because it confers the power to take ex–
post decisions. Wherever contingencies not speci…ed in the contracts arise, owners’ beliefs
become the principal guide for the solution eventually adopted. The legal structure of
the corporation re‡ects this by entitling shareholders to monitor managers and ultimately
…re them if they do not ful…ll their expectations (BLAIR [1995]). Moreover, shareholders
are claimants for the residual rights of control (HART [1995a]). However, even within
systems of corporate governance, the ownership structure of the corporations does not
present a homogeneous pattern (LA PORTA et al. [1999]). The question that arises then
is why some …rms are tightly held whereas others show widely dispersed shareholdings? A
number of recent studies have addressed this issue and the overall conclusion is that there
are con‡icting forces behind a given ownership structure. Holding substantial shares of
equity implies important bene…ts derived from the control of corporate decision–making.1
The downside are the associated costs.
AGHION AND BOLTON [1992], for example, argue that when an entrepreneur has to
raise new funds the marginal costs of sharing control with new shareholders have to be
weighed against the chances of losing control to outside investors. This has been observed
in the evolution of the initial shareholder control in German and UK …rms (GOERGEN
AND RENNEBOOG [2003]) and concurs with the existence of rationing and discrimination
in the allocation of shares in UK initial public o¤erings (BRENNAN AND FRANKS [1997]).
However, a more dispersed ownership structure leads to the classical agency problem be-
tween managers and owners. Large shareholders may mitigate this problem as long as the
bene…ts from controlling the …rm pay o¤ (SHLEIFER AND VISHNY [1986], HOLDERNESS
AND SHEEHAN [1988]; see, however, BANERJEE et al [1997] and FRANKS et al [2001]). In
Belgium, for example, the disciplining e¤ects of large shareholders have been observed in
industrial companies and families (RENNEBOOG[2000]). However, BURKARTet al. [1997]
show that there is a trade–o¤ between the gains obtained from a tight control over man-
agers’ decisions and the costs of constraining managers’ initiative. Moreover, as BOLTON
1As pointed out by ZWIEBEL [1995, 162], although “private bene…ts of control have received much
attention recently, much of this literature is vague on the origins of these bene…ts. Among plausible
sources are the ability of managers (or directors) to dilute corporate funds for private bene…t, synergies
obtainable through mergers, favours conferred by a …rm, access to inside information, perquisites of control,
and utility derived from power or control” (emphasis added). On the importance of power in corporate
governance see also TRICKER [1998], RAJAN AND ZINGALES [1998] and ZINGALES [1998]. A related
concept is that of authority, as discussed by AGHION AND TIROLE [1997].
1AND VON THADDEN [1998a], [1998b] pointed out, increasing ownership concentration re-
duces the chances of managerial slack but also lowers market capitalization, and therefore
the liquidity trading in the secondary market. BECHT [1999], indeed, …nds that there is
a negative relationship between blockholding and the liquidity of the German and Belgian
stock exchanges.
The aim of this paper is to contribute to this literature by discussing the role of risk
and control factors in the ownership structure of corporations. I present a simple model
in which large shareholders trade o¤ the costs of higher ownership shares, in terms of
less diversi…ed risk, against the bene…ts, in terms of greater control. In particular, the
investment decision is shaped by i) their risk aversionand a “risk–neutral e¤ect”due to the
limited diversi…cation of their portfolios (DEMSETZ AND LEHN [1985, 1158]), and ii) the
e¤ectiveness of alternative or complementary mechanisms to ownership concentration for
disciplining managers’ behaviour. The model indicates that changes in the characteristics
of governance, the information available to the investor and the size of the …rm directly
a¤ect ownership concentration. Moreover, given that governance systems are de…ned by a
set ofdisciplinary mechanisms, control factors aremore likely too¤set risk factors whenever
a convenient combination of these mechanisms is present. Therefore, in these contexts we
expect ownership concentration to be high but the other disciplinary mechanisms to be
weak. In the second part of the paper I analyse two institutional settings that …t into this
pattern.
Other studies have investigated the trade–o¤ between risk and control. ADMATI et al.
[1994], for example, analyse an ownership structure made up of a large monitoring–active
shareholder and afringeof small passiveshareholders. Important di¤erenceswithour study
are that investors are assumed to be risk–averse and there are multiple risky securities. In
fact, their mainconcernis the optimality ofthe allocationof shares in terms of risk sharing,
an aspect which is beyond the scope of this paper. Notice alsothat they focus onownership
concentration and do not consider alternative or complementary mechanisms that may also
discipline managers (HART [1995b], MOERLAND [1995]). The emphasis on the corporate
governance approach adopted here is closer to the seminal paper of DEMSETZ AND LEHN
[1985]. These authors maintain, as we do, that shareholders evaluate the dis/advantages
of di¤useness and concentration guided by a value (i.e. utility) maximisation goal. In
particular, they propose three driving forces in the election of an ownership structure, all
of which are somehow considered in the model: the size of the …rm, control potential and
regulation.
In line with the conclusions reached by DEMSETZ AND LEHN [1985] and the cross–
2sectional evidence provided by LA PORTA et al. [1998], the comparative statics of the
model suggest that strong external disciplinary mechanisms (e.g. legal conditions) tend to
reduce ownership concentration. That is, a system of corporate governance that strengths
the external mechanism as it evolves would show a simultaneous reduction in ownership
concentration. This is the …rst testable hypothesis of the model.2 Unfortunately, its
long–term nature makes it di¢cult to test it properly. One attempt to do so, based on
interpreting empirical evidence on the evolution of the ownership structure in American
corporations, is presented in section 4.
The American case is interesting because since BERLE AND MEANS [1932] it is the
kingdom of the “open corporation”. Besides, it has a long tradition of studies on the
joint–stock corporation. Notably, A.D. CHANDLER’s work [1977], [1990] has thoroughly
documented the rise of the large–scale, widely held companies in the last third of the
nineteenth century. However, before World War I the ownership of signi…cant shares of eq-
uity was still common in many of these large …rms. One must bear in mind these were the
years of the large family concerns (Carnegie, Morgan, Rockefeller, Stillman and Vanderbilt,
among others) andthat some institutional shareholders (e.g., investment bankers and inde-
pendent promoters) also played an important role in the governance of many corporations.
American business history therefore provides scope for discussing our tenets.
DEMSETZ AND LEHN [1985] also argue that risk aversion and the risk–neutral e¤ect
imply a negative relationship betweenownership concentration and…rm size (hereafter this
is referred to as the D–L claim). However, if the bene…ts from control are strong enough,
the concentration–size relationship could even be positive, as the discussion in section
2 is intended to show. Casual observance of the current corporate governance systems
around Continental Europe supports our line of reasoning (BARCA and BECHT [2001]).
The German, French and Italian cases clearly suggest that risk cannot be the only variable
to guide shareholders’ investment decisions. All these countries are characterised by high
levels of ownership concentration and frequent intervention by shareholders in the a¤airs
of the company.
More speci…cally, the model shows that the D–L claim holds as long as certain wealth
constraints apply.3 Empirical evidence from the Spanish system of corporate governance
2The model also predicts that the optimal level of investment is lower for shareholders who are bet-
ter informed about the characteristics of the internal mechanisms of control (e.g., boards of directors).
However, the lack of appropriate information in the data set used in this study precludes testing this
relationship here. This is left for future research.
3In a related study on initial public o¤erings, GOERGEN AND RENNEBOOG [2003] …nd that wealth
constraints a¤ect UK shareholders but are not binding for German shareholders. They argue that large
3in the early 1990’s to support this second testable hypothesis is presented in section 5. The
Spanish case is interesting because, as suggested e.g. in the annual reports of the Spanish
Stock Exchange (CNMV [1989] – [1995]), in most listed companies ownership concentration
is the central element of the governance system. This is a critical feature that enables us
to considerably simplify the set of disciplinary mechanisms, i.e. the vector of relevant
explanatory variables in the econometric speci…cation relating ownership concentration
and size in an unbalanced panel of Spanish listed …rms. A similar empirical strategy can
be found inCRESPI [1998], but following the D–L claim. Taking into account shareholders’
wealth constraints, however, our estimates showthat the D–L claim holds for certain types
of shareholders (e.g., individuals) but not for others (e.g., non–…nancial companies and the
State).
The last section of the paper summarises the main conclusions and suggests possible
extensions for future research.
2 Risk and Control in the Ownership Structure of
Corporations
The essence of the governance puzzle is the separation between the ownership of shares
and the control over the principal policies of the …rm (BERLE AND MEANS [1932]). A
shareholder owning 100% of the shares would enjoy all the bene…ts of control. However,
s/he would also have to bear the risk of holding an undiversi…ed portfolio. Selling o¤
some shares may provide risk–sharing gains (ADMATI et al. [1994]), depending ultimately
on her/his degree of risk aversion and the relative size of the investment with respect to
her/his wealth– i.e. the risk–neutral e¤ect discussedby DEMSETZANDLEHN [1985]. The
downside of share dispersion is that managers enjoy more leeway than in a tightly held
…rm. It turns out that small shareholders do not monitor managers optimally because of
the possibility of free–riding. In these contexts they may end up being merely entitled to
receive dividends whereas managers, as supreme interpreters of “what is best for the …rm”,
can even decide on the appropriate timing for the returns on shareholders’ investments.
Payouts and con‡icts of interest are only part of the story, however. In a world of
incomplete contracts, corporate governance matters because ownership confers residual
German shareholders may be receiving more private bene…ts of control because of the weaker protection of
their rights. The comparative statics of our model suggest that legislation and regulation are indeed impor-
tant explanatory factors of the concentration–size relationship, but our framework is more comprehensive
in the sense that it considers the whole set of control mechanisms.
4rights of control upon nonhuman assets (HART [1995a]).4 It is precisely in such a world,
in which transaction costs preclude the “comprehensive contract” solution, that ownership
concentration, the composition of the board and the market for (partial) corporate control
arise as mechanisms that can mitigate the agency problem (HART [1995b]). Governance
mechanisms are also important because of their regulatory role in the generation and
distribution of quasi–rents (ZINGALES [1998]). Access to the …rm’s assets, for example,
does not confernewresidual rightsofcontrol. Itis, however, analternativeway ofallocating
power within the organization because it a¤ects the ex–post bargaining process over the
surplus generated in the …rm. As TRICKER [1998, 2] pointed out, “corporate governance
is about power – the wielding of power over corporate entities”.
Large shareholders are therefore in a privileged position to obtain a large part of these
quasi–rents throughtheir power to in‡uence appointments to the boardand/or their ability
to gain easier access to key resources of the company (RAJAN AND ZINGALES [1998]).
Moreover, their monitoring role is subject to receive bene…ts from control that are larger
than the costs of shirking (SHLEIFER AND VISHNY [1986]). As shown by BURKART et al.
[1997], large shareholders will exert their authority to reverse managers’ decisions whenever
there is a net gain in doing so. Interestingly, they also show that the set of states of the
world in which this is likely to happen expands as ownership concentration increases.
In this vein, the expected bene…ts of holding a large share of equity may be substan-
tial enough to overcome risk aspects relating to the amount of the investment. However,
ownership concentration does not act in isolation from other governance mechanisms. As
LA PORTA et al. [1998] pointed out, for example, it is a substitutive mechanism in legal
settings characterised by poor and ine¤ective protection of investors’ interests – see also
GOERGEN AND RENNEBOOG [2003]. More generally, AGRAWAL AND KNOEBER [1996]
show that these interrelationships apply to the whole set of mechanisms (debt policy, the
managerial labour market, the market for corporate control, etc.). Therefore, a framework
for the analysis of corporate ownership must allow for alternative and/or complementary
4Ownership also confers a formal authority established by statutory or legal rules. Nevertheless, due
to, for example, information asymmetries between principals and agents (AGHION AND TIROLE [1997]),
this does not need to entail real authority. From an empirical point of view, the fact that control rights by
shareholders are not necessarily equivalent to e¤ective control over the corporation raises interesting issues
for the research on corporate governance (albeit not directly relevant for the problem addressed here).
LEECH AND LEAHY [1991] and LEECH AND MANJON [2002], for example, discuss the use of probabilistic
and game–theoretic measures of control (for the sake of simplicity these are not used here); HERMAN
[1981], LA PORTA et al. [1999], RENNEBOOG [2000] and BARCA and BECHT [2001], for example, stress
the importance of considering “ultimate control” (see also foonote 9).
5mechanisms of control (MOERLAND [1995]), for they may alter the expectations of power
and control deriving from the ownership of shares. In particular, empirical analyses risk
reaching biased conclusions if they do not control for these alternative mechanisms. For-
tunately, as shown by FRANKS et al [2001], all these mechanisms neither focus necessarily
on disciplining managers in poorly performing companies, nor do they always exert a sig-
ni…cant disciplinary e¤ect. Researchers may take advantage of these caveats and reduce
the set of mechanisms by selecting those that are relevant for the analysis.5
3 Theoretical framework
To illustrate some of these issues at greater length it is useful to discuss them in a
framework de…ned by a simple model of investment under uncertainty. The interest here
is focused on a (the) large(st) shareholder/investor. However, I do not claim that it accu-
rately represents her/his actual behaviour. In fact, important aspects such as tax policies,
multiple securities, strategic behaviour against rivals (there is only one investor) or dy-
namics are not taken into account.6 Rather, they are left for future research. The model
is a purely one–step, one–period decision that aims to show that:
5Notice that this empirical strategy is conditionaltoan appropriate assessment of the set of mechanisms.
To illustrate its potential drawbacks, let us consider a hypothetical study on the determinants of the
ownership structure of German corporations. “In the stereotypical view of German …nance, hostile tender
o¤ers are virtually unheard of, with banks (rather than markets) assumed to play an important role in
both the …nancingand controlof German corporations” (JENKINSON AND LJUNGQVIST [2001, 397–398]).
Accordingly, an econometric model including proxies for the banks’ monitoring activity (e.g. proxy votes)
as explanatory variables but omitting measures of the market for corporate control may nevertheless reach
accurate conclusions. However, the empirical evidence provided by JENKINSON AND LJUNGQVIST [2001]
challenge this stereotypical view and suggest that “the building of hostile stakes” may represent a level
of hostile acquisitions “of a similar magnitude to the incidence of hostile takeovers in the UK”. Moreover,
these authors raise caveats on the monitoring role of German banks and emphasise their assistance to the
predator companies. As a consequence, our econometric speci…cation, correct under the widespread view
of the German system of corporate governance, would be misleading unless we somehow controlled for
these complex stakebuilding strategies.
6Related studies such as AGHION AND BOLTON [1992], BURKART et al. [1997] and BOLTON AND
VON THADDEN [1998a], [1998b] share some of these simplifying features. On the other hand, taxes
are indirectly addressed by SHLEIFER AND VISHNY [1986]; multiple securities are the main concern of
ADMATI et al. [1994] and are discussed at some point by RAJAN AND ZINGALES [1998]; and the strategic
behaviour is an important element of ZWIEBEL’s [1995] paper. Admittedly, the main caveat to be cast on
our model is its static setting (see also SHLEIFER AND VISHNY [1986] and ZWIEBEL [1995]). As shown
below, however, its predictions can be interpreted in a long–term, dynamic perspective.
6Proposition 1 : Achieving a certain percentage of equity in a …rm depends not only on
risk concerns, but also on the distinctive features of the corporate governance that shape
control factors. Other things being equal, moreover, higher (lower) levels of investment
are more frequent in …rms and/or institutional settings in which the ownership of shares
confers a high (low) control over corporate decision–making.
3.1 A simple model
Let us consider an investor who is contemplating buying a large stake of equity in a
corporation. For the sake of simplicity, budget constraints and market restrictions are not
considered: s/he has the chance and the means to become a large (or even the largest)
shareholder in the company. The ultimate reasons behind this decision are not a major
concern here. We might suppose, for example, that s/he already has a small stake in the
…rm and is now considering increasing the size of the investment. Alternatively, we can see
the investment as part of a diversi…cation strategy in other sectors, other countries, etc.
Suchstakebuldingbehaviour is not uncommon inthe stock markets –see, e.g., JENKINSON
AND LJUNGQVIST [2001]. In any case, our interest lies in the size of the investment s/he
will eventually hold and on its determinants.
Following on from our previous discussion, it is assumed that the investor’s decision
is guided by control and risk factors. The former are related to the percentage of equity
eventually held and to the characteristics of the governance system, while the latter arise
from risk–aversionandrisk–neutral e¤ects. Formally, let us assume that the investor’s pref-
erences are represented by a von Newmann–Morgenstern utility function (U) that is twice
continuously di¤erentiable and additively separable in control (c) and risk (r) components:
U(c;r) = c(i;±
E;±
I)¡ r(w) = c(i;±
E;±
I)¡ r(A¢ i) ; (1)
where i 2 [0;1] is the percentage of equity; ±
E 2 [0;1] and ±
I 2 [0;1] are indices (to be
analysed in detail later) that summarise the features of the corporate governance; and A is
the ratio between …rm size (in terms oftotal equity) andinvestor’s wealth, i.e. r(:) depends
on the relative amount of the investment with respect to the investor’s wealth, w = A ¢ i.
It is assumed that the greater the ratio between investment and wealth, the greater the
disutility in a non–decreasing way, dr
dw > 0 and d2r
d2w > 0. On the other hand, c is increasing
and concave in i,
@c(i;±E;±I)
@i > 0 and
@2c(i;±E;±I)
@2i < 0. Also, given that controlling factors are
likely to arise only after a certain threshold of investment has been achieved ( i ), it seems
reasonable to set c(i;±
E;±
I) = 0;8i 2 [0;i]. Figure 1 illustrates these assumptions.
7[Insert Figure 1]
The governance system is represented by the deltas, which are meant to discern the
degreeofe¢cacy anddevelopmentof alternative mechanisms ofcontrol. Inour notation, ±
E
accounts for the “external” disciplinary mechanisms (e.g. the market for corporate control
and the competition in the product markets), whereas ±
I accounts for the “internal” ones
(e.g. board of directors, executive compensation and debt). The characteristics of the
external mechanisms are considered known, so ±
E is a scalar between one and zero for,
respectively, market–oriented systems (the Anglo–American model) and network–oriented
systems (such as those in Continental Europe). Moreover, it is assumed that the increase
in the utility from control obtained by an extra one per cent of equity will decrease when
the e¢cacy of these external mechanisms increases,
@2c(i;±E;±I)
@±E@i < 0.
As for the internal mechanisms, it is assumed that some information is hidden to the
outsiders. In particular, there are unrevealed factors at the …rm level that introduce un-
certainty to the shareholders’ assessment of the control conferred by the investment. As
illustrative examples I can mention management entrenchment, institutional sharehold-
ers’ activism and other stakeholders’ preferences. I model this by de…ning ±
I as a binary








L) to distinguish, respectively, …rms with
strong and weak internal mechanisms. The investor’s subjective probabilities associated
with these values are Pr(±
I = ±
I
H) = q and Pr(±
I = ±
I






@i , i.e. the control obtained by an increase in the level of investment
is higher the weaker the internal mechanisms.
Under these assumptions the shareholder chooses the optimal level of investment (i¤)
by maximising his/her expected utility:
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As suggested in the …rst part of Proposition 1, the optimum depends on the balance
of two factors: i) the characteristics of the corporate governance, which shape the expected
7The …rst order condition of the interior maximum is a necessary and su¢cient condition since the
objective function is strictly concave with respect to i.
8marginal utility extracted from the control associated with achieving a certain level of
investment; ii) risk e¤ects, including those derived from the relative size of the …rm with
respect to the investor’s wealth and those related with the agent’s degree of risk–aversion.
Lower levels of investment are dominated by risk concerns up to a point at which control
factors o¤set and eventually overcome them (see Figure 1). Moreover, as suggested in the
secondpart of Proposition 1, ownership concentration depends (other things beingequal)
on the relation between the level of investment and the utility of its associated control. In
particular, it will be higher in systems of corporate governance and/or …rms characterised
by weak alternative disciplinary mechanisms.
3.2 Further insights
Comparative statics
Let us further consider the implications of the model with regard to the ownership
structure of the corporations by analysing the comparative statics of the optimum. From























Therefore, the model predicts that a better informed shareholder holds a lower per-
centage of shares than an uninformed one. However, s/he will increase her/his share of
equity whenever s/he observes a weakening of an internal disciplinary mechanism (e.g. the
exit of an institutional shareholder or an independent director). This “balancing” e¤ect
agrees with the scarce empirical evidence on the issue (AGRAWAL AND KNOEBER [1996],
CRESPÍ–CLADERA AND GISPERT [2002]).





















This suggests that a change in the institutional setting (for example, the legal frame-
work) which improves the e¢cacy of the external mechanisms will entail lower levels of
investment, and vice versa. This is consistent with the cross–sectional international evi-
dence provided by LA PORTA et al. [1998]. I further illustrate this in the next section by
discussing the evolution of the American case since the turn of the twentieth century.


















According to the model, an increase (decrease) in the size of the …rm in terms of
total equity would lead, ceteris paribus, to a decrease (increase) in the stake held by the
shareholder. In essence, this is the D–L line of reasoning. However, the opposite e¤ect
arises when we consider variations in the investor’s wealth: holding the absolute size of the
…rm constant, the amount of money s/he is willing to invest is directly related to her/his
wealth – see, e.g., GOERGEN AND RENNEBOOG [2003]. Therefore, I conclude that small
(large) …rms with respect to the investor’s wealth will tend to be more (less) concentrated.8
I illustrate this in section 5 using data on Spanish listed …rms.
Majority shareholders
The result in (6) leads to an interesting discussion about the existence of majority
shareholders. Full control of the corporation does not demand 100% of shares. In fact,
oncea certaindegree of control is achieved no signi…cant gains are expectedfrom raising the
level of investment (AGHION AND BOLTON [1992]). Why, then, are majority shareholders
foundall overthe world? The model suggests thatthese should be…rms in whichthelargest
shareholder has a negligible risk–neutral e¤ect (A), i.e. the size of the …rm is very small
compared to the wealth of the investor. E¤ectively, typical examples are subsidiary …rms,
family concerns andState–owned companies. Subsidiaries and State–owned companies can
be very large, butthe controllingshareholder (another company, theState) is comparatively
very wealthy. Similarly, family …rms are usually small companies and the share of the
individual’s wealth involved in the investment is therefore not too big (or is allocated
between the members of the family when the …rm becomes larger). This is consistent with
the evidence on majority shareholders provided by SHEEHAN AND HOLDERNESS [1988]
in the USA and LEECH AND MANJON [2002] in Spain.
8To a certain extent, this agrees with the international empirical evidence on the determinants of the
ownership structure. DEMSETZ AND LEHN [1985] in the USA and LEECH AND LEAHY [1991] in the
United Kingdom, for example, report negative and statistically signi…cant coe¢cients for variables of size.
PROWSE [1992] obtains similar results for Japan, but only in …rms integrated in a keiretsu. On the other
hand, MURALI AND WELCH [1989] do not …nd signi…cant values for the size coe¢cient in a sample of
American …rms with majority shareholders. In Spain, however, CRESPI [1998] and GALVE AND SALAS
[1993] report a positive relationship between size and ownership concentration.
10Firms heterogeneity
It also seems important to bear in mind that the actual shape of the utility functions is
di¤erent for every single company. What the model shows is that the particular features of
its governance system will alter the optimal level of investment and open upa wide range of
possibilities. That is, given a certain risk–e¤ect, relatively low percentages of equity (e.g.,
5%, 10%, 15%) will, in some contexts, entail high levels of control; in others, however,
similar standards will only be possible through substantial minorities (e.g. 40%, 45%) or
even huge majorities (e.g. 60%, 75%, 90%). This conclusion agrees with the diversity in
ownership structures observed around the world by LA PORTA et al. [1999] and BARCA
and BECHT [2001].
Empirical tests
The empirical evidence provided in the next sections is intended to further support
these arguments. I will analyse the set of control mechanisms in two di¤erent institutional
settings and show that in both of them ownership concentration naturally arises as the
main one. I will then test some of the insights gained from the comparative statics: how
changes in the institutional setting a¤ect the concentration of ownership (in the USA since
the turn of the century) and what the relationship is between ownership concentration and
…rm size when we control for di¤erences in the investor’s wealth (in a sample of Spanish
listed …rms inthe 1990’s). The relationshipbetween ownership structure andother internal
mechanisms is left for future research.
4 Case 1: USA at the turn of the twentieth century
The turn of the twentieth century saw the rise of the big American businesses and the
development of modern management techniques. The “managerial enterprise” described
by CHANDLER [1977], [1990] is a large, multiunit enterprise run by a hierarchy of salaried
managers with little or no stock ownership in the company. However, the open corporation
observed by BERLE AND MEANS [1932] was not an instant achievement but a progressive
process that took place over the decades that followed the Second Industrial Revolution
around the 1880’s. In this section I aim to show that some stylised facts in this historical
period point to ownership concentration as an optimal solution for the governance of many
large …rms. Later I will present empirical evidence on the ownership structure of American
…rms based on two previous studies: TAUSSIG AND BARKER [1925] and HERMAN [1981].
11Lastly, I will argue that the evolution of the American system of corporate governance
since those days is consistent with the predictions of the model.
4.1 Governance mechanisms
Founders and family …rms
Incorporation was commonplace among large industrial companies by the 1890’s but
most of these were still held by a small group of people, namely the founders and their rel-
atives. New funds, when needed, were mostly obtained by issuing preferred stock (without
voting rights) and debt …nancing. As NAVIN AND SEARS [1955, 127] pointed out, “own-
ership might have spread, but to a limited degree; shares might have become available to
outsiders, but to a restricted extent”. In fact, as CHANDLER [1962] shows, the in‡uence
of the family group extended to long periods after the foundation of the company. The
Du Pont, GM, Standard Oil, and Sears and Roebuck studies prove that this decisive role
remained even after mergers or acquisitions had taken place. Needless to say, this does not
mean that these owners were involved in day–to–day operations; nor should one dismiss
the growing importance of widely held corporations as industry leaders. Yet the weight of
closely held corporations and family concerns among the largest US industrial enterprises
before World War I should not be underestimated.
Institutional shareholders
As for the institutional shareholders, until very recently several regulations restricted
the activities of banks and insurance companies in the American governance arena (ROE
[1994]). These were barred from owning stock and underwriting securities and so any form
of control over a corporation was out of the question. However, critically associated with
the early development of a market for common stocks were a group of investment bankers
andindependent promoters. As shown by BASKINANDMIRANTI [1997], representatives of
these institutional shareholders were on the Boards of Directors and had a say in important
corporate decisions. These played an important role in the governance of some companies
because they had incentives to use the voice rather than the exit strategies.
Market mechanisms
In contrast with the importance of family groups and institutional shareholders, it may
be argued that in this period the e¤ectiveness of market mechanisms for monitoring man-
agers was dubious. The market for corporate control and the market for managerial talent,
12for example, were in their early stages. As for the competition in the input and product
markets, this was considerably limited due to backwards and forwards integration strate-
gies (CHANDLER [1977]). Moreover, leavingaside railroad companies and some exceptional
cases in the extractive and textile sectors, a large–scale market for industrial securities did
not exist at least until the 1920’s (NAVIN AND SEARS [1955]). Stock was usually trans-
mitted through informal channels between relatives, friends, and partners. Another factor
worth noting is the poor quality of the …nancial reports for making managers accountable
and the lack of reliable information for assessing market risk. E¤ective regulations on
…nancial disclosure and agents’ responsibilities were not implemented until the Securities
Acts of 1933 and 1934 (BASKIN AND MIRANTI [1997]). Therefore, it appears that own-
ers (founders, relatives and institutional shareholders) could not trust market mechanisms
with the burden of monitoring managers.
4.2 Some indirect evidence on the ownership structure
Ownership concentration is a simple and well–knownmechanism for aligning sharehold-
ers’ and managers’ interests. But did the American corporations of the early twentieth
century employ this solution? The extant, albeit scarce, empirical evidence seems indeed
to support this possibility.
HERMAN [1981], for example, analyses the ownership structure of a sample of 40 large
…rms in the period 1900–1901. On the basis of an ultimate control classi…cation the study
shows that widely held …rms were much less common than closely held companies, family
concerns and those managed under the in‡uence of bankers and promoters (the proportion
was approximately one out of four). Unfortunately, the study does not provide detailed
information on the size of these holdings. Yet it is remarkable that i) except for the (widely
held) Management category, all were above 5% of the voting stock; ii) in13 companies they
were above 10%; and iii) in 5 companies an individual or control group owned the majority
of shares.
Further supportive evidence can be found in the TAUSSIG AND BARKER [1925] study
on the executives of around 400 …rms during the period 1904–1905 to 1913–1915. In
about 10%–20% of these …rms the ownership of shares by their executives was practically
negligible (below 1% of capital stock). However, most …rms in the sample were closely
held. As an illustration, around 50% (70%) of the largest (smallest) …rms in the sample
had a large shareholder with more than 20% of the capital stock. In fact, these …gures
probably underestimate the actual level of concentration because in about half of the …rms
relatives and friends of the executives were among the large shareholders of the company.
134.3 Discussion
Family …rms, institutional shareholders’ activism and ownership concentration appear
to be common features in a substantial number of large US corporations at the turn of
the century. But their importance progressively declined in subsequent periods, whereas
other mechanisms of control (e.g. the market for corporate control and the market for
managerial talent) were becoming more active. There were also substantial improvements
in public accounting and statistical information on …nancial markets during the 1920’s
and 1930’s as well as important changes in the legal setting, particularly with regard to
institutional shareholders and tax policies (BASKIN AND MIRANTI [1997]). Accordingly,
the characteristics of the corporate governance system evolved from a network–oriented
model towards a market–based one (BLAIR [1995]).
The ultimate reasons behind this evolution are not addressed in this paper. Following
BEBCHUK AND ROE [1999], for example, one may argue that changes in the corporate
rules broke the path–dependence tendency of the ownership structure. Whatever these
reasons are, the argument presented here is still valid: the institutional setting at the turn
of the century particularly favoured a high concentration of ownership. Conditions were
less advantageous thereafter and our model predicts a decrease in the levels of ownership
concentration. This is precisely what has been observed in American …rms since World
War II.
5 Case 2: the Spanish system of corporate governance
Spanish Stock Exchanges are supervised, controlled, and inspected by the Comisión
Nacional del Mercado de Valores (CNMV). On the whole, the system is broadly similar
to the French and German systems. Some characteristics of the Spanish Stock Market in
the early 1990’s are worth noting, however: i) the small number of listed …rms; ii) the low
percentage of free ‡oat (market traded share) in most companies; iii) the concentration
of market turnover in very few stocks (around 10%–15% of companies accounted for more
than 90% of market turnover); iv) the low frequency of hostile takeovers; and v) the lack
of activism of most institutional shareholders (CNMV [1989] – [1995], BARCA and BECHT
[2001]).
All in all, there is general agreement that the cornerstone of the Spanish system of
corporate governance is ownership concentration. However, large shareholders do not dis-
cipline managers through the partial market for corporate control (i.e. block transfers).
Rather, they tend to intervene directly and replace the incumbent managers when …rm
14performance is poor (GISPERT [1998], CRESPÍ–CLADERA AND GISPERT [2002]). This
institutional setting is therefore an interesting case in which control factors are likely to
o¤set the risk involved in investing large sums of money in a …rm’s equity. This section
focuses in particular on the relationship between the relative size of the company and own-
ership concentration using a data set of industrial listed companies based on the registers
of the CNMV in the period 1991 to 1995 (LEECH AND MANJON [2002]). First I present
descriptive statistics and later provide econometric evidence.
5.1 Ownership structure
The descriptive analysis of the ownership structure of these companies shows the high
concentration of shares (Table 1). In fact, if we take into account the previous remarks
on the weakness of the alternative disciplinary mechanisms (the takeover market, the role
of institutional shareholders, etc.) the …gures in Table 1 are consistent with the idea
that control deriving from equity ownership is a principal factor in the Spanish system of
corporate governance. On average, the largest shareholder in a Spanish listed …rm holds
about 40% of equity and about two thirds are held by the …ve largest ones.9 Ownership
concentration increased steadily throughout this period and revealed positive di¤erences
between large and medium–sized …rms. These two facts suggest that equity investment
decisions may well beguidedby reasons otherthanrisk concerns.10 Thedegreeofvariability
in the population, however, is worthnoting. These companies do not de…ne a homogeneous
sample and so …rm–speci…c e¤ects seem to be important.
[Insert Table 1]
9The shares of the largest and …ve largest shareholders are calculated following a majority shareholding
criterion to de…ne the “ultimate control” – see, e.g., RENNEBOOG [2000, footnote 10] and LEECH AND
MANJON [2002, pp 162–163] for more details.
10Large and medium–sized …rms are de…ned on the basis of the median of Total Assets (book value,
millions of pesetas). Total Assets are generally agreed to be a good proxy for the size e¤ect and have indeed
been used in related studies – e.g. MURALI AND WELCH [1989] in the USA and CRESPI [1998] in Spain.
DEMSETZ AND LEHN [1985, 1164] also use the market value of equity, which admittedly appears to be a
better proxy – see also PROWSE’s [1992] study for Japan– but they claim that their conclusions were not
substantially a¤ected: “We have experimented with other size measures (e.g. book value of assets), but
the general nature of the statistical result is una¤ected by this choice” (see also CRESPÍ–CLADERA AND
GISPERT [2002] and GOERGEN AND RENNEBOOG [2003]). In their study on British companies, LEECH
AND LEAHY [1991] use the (log) Number of Employees whereas for Spain GALVE AND SALAS [1993] use
(log) Added Value.
15As for the nature of these large shareholders, Table 2 shows that large …rms are domi-
nated by other corporations and the government, whereas individuals and families cluster
around medium–sizedcompanies. Given the assumptions for constructing the data set, one
must be careful when interpreting these empirical results. Nevertheless, they clearly concur
with the insights provided by the theoretical framework. One may expect individuals and
families to be a¤ected by some wealth constraint, so their specialisation in medium–sized
…rms appears an attempt to circumvent this. Corporate investors, on the other hand, do
not su¤er this kind of restriction and have oriented their investments mostly towards large
…rms. This is also evident among State–owned companies.
[Insert Table 2]
5.2 Econometric results
This section provides further evidence on the relation between ownership concentration
and …rm size. The dependent variables of the econometric model are a logarithmic trans-
formation of the relative percentage of equity held by the largest (LS1) and …ve largest
(LS5) shareholders. Among the explanatory variables, the data set includes two alterna-
tive mechanisms of control: the ratio of current liabilities to long–term debt (QD) as a
proxy for …nancial policy; and the rate of EXPORT (as a percentage of Turnover) as a
proxy for the characteristics of the product market.11 Moreover, dummy variables allow
for the institutional nature of the largest shareholder. The breakdown includes individuals
(T1), non–…nancial corporations (T2), state–owned organisations (T3), banks (T4), family
groups (T5), holdings of private companies (T6), holdings of public …rms (T7) and “mixed
groups” in which related …rms and family groups were among the largest shareholders
(T8). These variables are introduced in the econometric speci…cation as products with the
variable of SIZE. The aim is to control for di¤erences in wealth between these types of
shareholders, as suggested by the comparative statics of our model in (6). The model also
includes a dummy variable for the majority–controlled corporations (MAJ) and sectoral
dummies to indirectly control for other covariates (e.g. other external mechanisms). The
11In principle, the econometric speci…cation should include further discipliningmechanisms e.g. measures
of labour managerial markets, takeovers, the composition of Boards, etc.. However, our data set does not
contain such detailed information. This omission may raise concerns about the potential bias, but such
concerns are relevant as long as the omitted mechanisms are acting e¤ectively. The empirical evidence on
the Spanish case suggests that this is at least doubtful. See, for example, CNMV [1989] – [1995], GALVE
AND SALAS [1993], GISPERT [1998], BARCA and BECHT [2001] and CRESPÍ-CLADERA AND GISPERT
[2002].
16unbalanced panel includes 162 …rms with three or more consecutive observations in the
period 1991 to 1995. Table 3 provides a summary of statistics and more details on the
construction of these variables.
[Insert Table 3]
Table 4 reports results for a linear speci…cation under di¤erent assumptions on the
stochastic properties of the error term (OLS, Within, and GLS estimators). OLS can be
seen as a benchmark for previous studies that have used cross–section data. However,
since …rms in the sample are heterogeneous the OLS estimates are biased. Fixed and
random e¤ects models were performed using an error component model with …rm–speci…c
e¤ects. In this way some control mechanisms not explicitly included in the model could be
incorporatedthroughthestructureof the errorterm. Asexpected, theHausmantest rejects
the null hypothesis of no correlation between the individual e¤ects and the explanatory
variables, so Within estimations seem more appropriate here than the GLS method.
[Insert Table 4]
These results show the con‡ict between control and risk factors. The size of the …rm
is statistically signi…cant for the individuals and its negative sign agrees with the tenet
that wealth constraints guide the investment decision. However, this constraint does not
seem so important for other shareholders. This is particularly clear for the groups or
coalitions of large shareholders (e.g. family …rms), but it is also apparent in non–…nancial
and public companies. Therefore, our results concur with the conclusions obtained from
the theoretical analysis. Moreover, they are robust to alternative stochastic assumptions
on the error term.
It may still be argued that the results are spurious and that they can also be explained
by, for instance, measurementand/or speci…cation errors. However, the econometric results
fully agree with the descriptive analyses and cast doubts on such a caveat. Moreover,
previous studies on Spanish listed …rms also found that the institutional features of the
largest shareholder appear to be related to the size of the …rm. GALVE AND SALAS [1993],
for example, use a simple model relating performance to size and ownership structure to
show that, on the basis of cross–sectional evidence, the controlling group determines the
size of the …rm. As an illustration, they conclude that family …rms tend to be smaller
(especially if they are majority–controlled) but more e¢cient than the average listed …rm.
In a related study, CRESPI [1998] discusses the determinants of the ownership structure
using aneconometric speci…cation similar to ours. Not surprisingly, the results of these two
17studies do not di¤er substantially. However, he fails to provide a satisfactory explanation
for the rejection of the D–L claim. Although he mentions the existence of bene…ts from
control, he eventually dismisses their importance and seems more willing to blame the
econometric modelling for a result that is “opposite to what one would expect”.
6 Concluding remarks
The ownership structure of large corporations has become a matter of recent concern
among researchers in corporate …nance. As a result, a number of trade–o¤s have been
detected between the advantages and disadvantages of a given ownership structure. This
has provided a better understanding of the diversity of ownership structures observed all
around the world. As an illustration of this, in light of recent scandals in corporate gover-
nance, policy makers may be tempted to encourage ownership concentration to increase the
monitoring of managers and reduce agency problems. However, ownership concentration
has its own costs, such as less liquidity in the equity markets. Moreover, policy makers
should be very aware that other mechanisms may, at least in principle, help to discipline
managers’ behaviour. Therefore, perhaps a better solution would be simply to reinforce
them.
This paper has investigated the trade–o¤ between risk and control in corporate own-
ership. In the …nancial literature there is a tendency to emphasize the risk involved in
holding a share of equity, whereas comparatively less heed is paid to the accompanying
control bene…ts for large shareholders (emphasised, on the other hand, in the literature on
the theory of the …rm). This study presents a simple model and evidence from di¤erent
institutional settings that suggest that both risk and control factors in‡uence the equity
investment decisions of large shareholders. In particular, the extant empirical evidence
appears to agree with the predictions of the model that changes in the characteristics of
governance, in the information available to the investor and in the size of the …rm a¤ect
ownership concentration.
Casual observance of the systems of corporate governance in continental Europe tends
to support our tenets. With obvious di¤erences, Germany, France and Italy seem to
be characterised by high ownership concentration and large shareholders’ receiving some
(non–pecuniary) bene…ts from their investments. Therefore, our estimates from a sample
of Spanish listed …rms in the 1990’s and the analysis of the American corporations at the
turn of the twentieth century should be backed up by further empirical results from these
countries. In particular, it would be interesting to test the informational predictions of the
18model, a task that is not performed here due to the lack of appropriate information.
To conclude, it seems also interesting to brie‡y discuss other issues that for simplicity
have been left aside. These are beyond the scope of this paper, but our theoretical frame-
work may be useful in future attempts to address them. First, the stakeholder approach
to corporate governance has not been explored. However, the shareholder’s utility func-
tion may include additional components to allow for the e¤ects of her/his decision on the
welfare of other stakeholders such as debtholders and workers. Second, investors do not
necessarily limit their interest to one asset. Investing in multiple securities would clearly
a¤ect the risk component of the utility function, but it could also be a source of bene…ts
if, for example, cross–shareholdings alter the competition in the product market. Third,
many corporations have more than one large shareholder. In France and Spain, for exam-
ple, one can …nd this kind of structure in the so–called, respectively, “noyaux durs” and
“nucleos duros”. These are said to be stable coalitions of shareholders, but to what extent
is this a sustainable equilibrium? Lastly, our model is static in the sense that the decision
to invest is taken instantaneously. This fact does not a¤ect the nature of our discussion.
Such an assumption, however, may be critical if we aim to analyse more complex settings.
A dynamic game that takes into account the interactions between shareholders’ strategies
is doubtless a research avenue to be pursued.








20Table 1. Ownership Concentration.
Percentage of Shares Owned by the Largest (S1) and Five Largest (S5) Shareholders.
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995
A L M A L M A L M A L M A L M
MeanS1 40.15 41.00 39.82 42.83 44.56 42.53 42.38 45.42 40.86 36.38 43.97 39.35 40.25 43.85 37.63
St.Dev.S1 26.83 27.04 26.00 27.48 27.93 26.67 26.84 26.83 25.48 25.43 25.50 24.83 26.46 26.37 23.77
Mean S5 58.68 56.12 61.10 62.20 61.74 64.31 63.12 64.09 64.70 62.08 63.82 63.93 61.74 63.72 62.50
St.Dev. S5 27.40 27.00 26.12 27.12 26.22 26.85 26.68 25.00 26.10 25.63 23.39 24.77 25.83 23.47 24.71
N 331 148 149 312 140 141 290 126 126 277 122 122 263 113 113
Source: CNMV.
A = All Sample L = Large Firms; M = Medium–sized Firms.Table 2. Ownership Concentration.
Percentage of Shares Owned by Type of Largest Shareholder.
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995
A L M A L M A L M A L M A L M
Individuals 0.20 0.06 0.34 0.19 0.05 0.33 0.20 0.06 0.32 0.21 0.04 0.34 0.21 0.05 0.35
Non-Fin. Corp. 0.65 0.72 0.57 0.66 0.74 0.57 0.63 0.68 0.57 0.65 0.74 0.60 0.64 0.71 0.58
State 0.07 0.13 0.02 0.07 0.14 0.01 0.08 0.16 0.02 0.08 0.14 0.02 0.08 0.16 0.02
Banks 0.06 0.07 0.04 0.05 0.06 0.04 0.06 0.08 0.04 0.05 0.07 0.03 0.05 0.06 0.04
Source: CNMV.
A = All Sample L = Large Firms; M = Medium–sized Firms. “Individuals” also includes
family groups (i.e. the variables T1 and T5 of Table 3). “Non–Financial Corpora-
tions” also includes holdings of private companies (i.e. T2 and T6). “State” includes
state-ownedorganisations and holdingsof public…rms (i.e. T3 and T7). Theresidual
category (not presented in the table) are …rms in which the largest shareholder is a
“mixed group” formed by related …rms and family groups (T8).Table 3. Summary of Statistics.
Variable Mean St. Dev. Min. Max.
S1 0:4024 0:2427 0:0001 1
S5 0:6190 0:2487 0:0001 1
MAJ 0:3364 0:4728 0 1
T1 0:0387 0:1930 0 1
T2 0:6168 0:4864 0 1
T3 0:0600 0:2377 0 1
T4 0:052 0:2223 0 1
T5 0:1321 0:3389 0 1
T6 0:0600 0:2377 0 1
T7 0:008 0:0892 0 1
T8 0:0320 0:1762 0 1
EXPORT 0:1294 0:2064 0 1
QD 0:7672 0:2423 0:0442 0:99
SIZE 0:0682 0:2655 82£ 10¡6 3:2452
N = 162 and N £ T = 749. S1 and S5 are the share held, respectively, by the
largest and …ve largest shareholders of the company following an “ultimate control”
classi…cation based on majority control. The dummy variable MAJ equals 1 if the
share of the largest shareholder is over 50%. T1 to T8 are dummy variables equal to
1 if the largest shareholder is an individual (T1), a non–…nancial corporation (T2), a
state-owned organisation (T3), a bank (T4), a family group (T5), a holding ofprivate
companies (T6), a holding of public …rms (T7) or a “mixed group” of related …rms
and family groups (T8). See LEECH AND MANJON [2002] for more details on the
de…nitions of these variables. EXPORT is the percentage of turnover sold to foreign
countries. QD istheratio of current liabilities to long–term debt. SIZE is total assets
(book value in millions of pesetas £10¡6).

























































































































































¤¤ 10% signi…cance; ¤ 5% signi…cance. LS1 = ln ( S1
1¡S1), LS5 = ln ( S5
1¡S5). De-
…nitions of S1, S5 and all the explanatory variables can be found in Table 3. For
the sake of simplicity, estimates from the sectoral dummies are omitted. F and Â2
are, respectively, F and Wald tests of the joint signi…cance of the set of explanatory
variables. Hausman test: 79:19¤ (LS1) and 39:42¤ (LS5).
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